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HAM MAY I MAGNUS MORNER ecclesiastical holdings. In a well-written paper on colonial haciendas of the Sabana of Bogota', Juan A. Villamarin also argues that these strongly market-tied units failed to raise the social status of the owners to any appreciable degree."1 It is evident that we must test our definitions against historical evidence before using them as analytical tools.'2 In this article I am going to deal mainly with the mixed livestock and grain-producing hacienda of the Mexican and Andean highlands and not so much with the estates specialized in the production of sugar or other "plantation" crops.
Encomienda and Hacienda
Until the 1940s, historians more or less took for granted that the hacienda was the derivation and continuation of the encomienda.'3 Silvio Zavala and Lesley B. Simpson then showed, however, that as an institution the encomienda did not imply any rights to the lands of the Indians. In principle, the encomienda implied the concession of Indian tributes by the Crown in favor of certain individuals in exchange for specific obligations, nothing else.'4 This legal and administrative distinction was rigorously upheld by the succeeding generation of historians. It is now being challenged, however, as being excessively institutional and, in some cases, at least, not consonant with socioeconomic realities. In his excellent pioneering study of the evolution of landed property in the Valley of Puangue near Santiago de Chile, Mario G6ngora, while admitting the juridical validity of the thesis of Zavala, shows that in this area there existed a "factual connection" between encomienda and hacienda. The encomenderos asked for and often received land grants close to the villages of their Indians.15 Also 11. Juan A. Villamarin, "Haciendas en la Sabana de Bogota, Colombia, en la epoca colonial" (Mimeograph, Rome, 1972).
12. To define a "rancho" is also hard. See Bazant in La historia economic, II, 113. In his paper on "Colonial Haciendas in the Valley of Oaxaca," prepared for the Rome meeting, William B. Taylor defines "hacienda" precisely as a "rural estate with a mixed economy of ranching and agriculture, permanent buildings and a resident labor force." The smaller units, "ranchos" and "labores," were specialized in cattle breeding and grain production respectively, but the labor system of the latter resembled that of the hacienda, Taylor admits. .15-Jean Borde and Mario G6ngora, Evolucion de la propiedad rural en el Valle del Puangue, I (Santiago de Chile, 1956), 29. Gongora is the author of the first part of the book. He has continued and broadened his discussion of the 187 Charles Gibson, in his remarkable study of the Valley of Mexico, found that the holding of an encomienda did in fact facilitate the acquisition of landed property."6 Even Zavala himself, in a study on Guatemala, noticed the tendency of some encomenderos to carve out haciendas within .the limits of their encomiendas.'7 However, the frequency with which this phenomenon occurred remains unknown.
In 1969, James Lockhart, in a very interesting and provocative article in this journal, observed that after all there were many more haciendas than there ever were encomiendas. He also pointed out that haciendas ganaderas were unlikely to have encomienda antecedents as, more often than not, they were founded in areas where Indians were sparse. He emphasized that a continuity that only expressed itself in the family links of the owners would be of very limited interest. Instead, Lockhart found a functional or phenomenological comparison much more rewarding. According to him, the labor systems used by encomenderos and hacendados were basically the same. The hereditary and aristocratic character of the master group is another common feature. Both encomenderos and hacendados divided their activities and residence between town and land. The two systems served in fact as a bridge between the urban and the rural sectors of early Spanish American society, Lockhart claimed.'8 Robert G. Keith, continuing the discussion in a recent article, stresses certain discontinuities between the two institutions. As he puts it, the encomienda "required the survival of the indigenous population without radical change, [whereas] relationship in his recent book, Encomenderos y estancieros. Estudios acerca de la constitution social aristocrdtica de Chile despues de la Conquista, 1580-166o (Santiago, 1970) . Referring to a scrutiny of 164 Chilean encomenderos in 1655, G6ngora concludes: "la encomienda ha terminado por ser una forma de obtencion de mano de obra rural. Los encomenderos de todo tipo, de viejas o nuevas familias, 
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the development of the hacienda system required that this society be largely destroyed and its members transformed into an agricultural proletariat."'9 Both interpretations inevitably suffer from the fact that the concepts of encomienda and hacienda cover an infinitely varied reality. Keith, it is true, tries to resolve this difficulty by making use of "ideal types" rather than "typical institutions." This is a device of very restricted usefulness, however. Lockhart and Keith have also been criticized for explaining essentially economic systems mainly in terms of their formal and institutional expressions.20 Yet it should be kept in mind that they have raised the level of the scholarly discussion considerably by showing how incongruous it is to compare the legal structure of the encomienda with the socio-economic function of the hacienda.
Origins of the Hacienda Scrutinized
Basing themselves on Borah's and Chevalier's interpretations of the Mexican experience, historians have agreed that there must have been some relationship between the tremendous demographic decline of the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, on the one hand, and the rise of the large landed estate on the other. But when one looks more closely at the presentations of this process, considerable discrepancies appear. Nevertheless, for some reason, these differences have not been adequately discussed. 21 Let us begin with Woodrow Borah, who considers population decline to be the main cause of economic crisis. Among the results of this crisis, Borah underscores the diminished importance of the Indians as suppliers of food to the urban population. Thus Spanish producers gained entry to, as Borah puts it, the "large expanding markets of the Spanish cities." He thinks that it is possible to discern a rise in demand for the products of the haciendas, reflected in both prices and wages.22 It must be added that the demographic evolution of the non-Indian population of the cities, on which Borah bases this interpretation, is much more hypothetical and less well documented than the decline of Indian population. Charles Gibson supports Borab's view, however, The disagreement of the authors mentioned with respect to the trend and impact of prices could not be more striking. As a matter of fact, none of them had at his disposal more than scattered data on prices to support his views. Consequently, only a future investigation of prices in Mexico during the seventeenth century will make it possible to judge which of the opposing ideas is more justified.
The pioneering study of Enrique Florescano on Mexican maize prices is restricted to the period from 1708 to 18io. Following the example of French historians, Florescano tries to discern seasonal and cyclical movements as well as the secular trend. He underscores the socio-economic effects of the cyclical movements especially, demonstrating that the times of profits for the hacendados were those when the masses were suffering from hunger and misery. He also emphasizes the enormous regional differences in price levels and the series of obstacles the haciendas faced in reaching beyond their immediate regional markets. These observations are relevant also for the seven- There is another interesting disagreement between the authors discussed. For Chevalier, the hacienda, under the impact of the crisis in mining, withdrew from the larger economy, henceforth to pursue the ideal of self-sufficiency. Stanley and Barbara Stein follow the same line when claiming that miners and merchants shifted investment to land, accelerating the formation of the hacienda. Later, without the stimulus of the mines as a source of specie and as a market, the hacienda tended to become, as they put it, "relatively self-sufficient."30 On the other hand, for Borah, Frank, and even Wolf, the estates of the seventeenth century merely adapted themselves to a new commercial situation.
Recently, the self-sufficiency theory of Chevalier has been challenged on two points. David Brading has observed that while the cattle hacienda of northern Mexico would have possessed the motivation and flexibility required for such a withdrawal, the sugar-and grain-producing estates of the South would not. colleague, Peter Bakewell, in his study of Zacatecas mining society, shows that instead of withdrawing to their "self-sufficient" haciendas, ruined miners indeed used to lose these estates entirely.32 Actually the contrast between "self-sufficiency" and market orientation should not be overemphasized. Wolf rightly underlines the great capacity of the hacienda to reduce production when market conditions were adverse, as well as to increase the output when they became favorable.33 We also have to keep in mind that while haciendas, as Arnold Bauer puts it, were "essentially . .. set up to provide European food-mainly wheat and beef-for the white population," the Indian workers were usually supposed to grow maize and beans on subsistence plots.34 In his comparison of encomienda and hacienda, James Lockhart makes another interesting point. He thinks that the encomienda already exhibits the same features of self-sufficiency or, rather, economic diversification and social integration as the later hacienda. If so, how could the upward economic trend of the early sixteenth century that witnessed the formation of the encomienda produce the same result as the seventeenth-century depression? Furthermore, he points out that in terms of the prevailing ideas of mercantilism, the seventeenth-century hacienda did make good economic sense. Rather than aspiring to increased production, the aim was to "monopolize, drive out competition and sell at high prices to a severely limited market." Land hoarding would serve to eliminate local competitors.35
In the light of all these observations, it does seem rather sterile to discuss whether the hacienda arose as a closed economy, aiming at self-sufficiency, as Chevalier claimed, or whether, on the contrary, it was always dependent on the market, as Frank feels. I think it is clear that henceforth a major task for research will be to determine the relative importance of the links of the haciendas to their markets through time. The changes in the relation between production for 32. Bakewell, Zacatecas, pp. 1 17-1 i8. In Zacatecas, according to this thorough study, the seventeenth century, "far from being a period of formation or even static consolidation of estates, was for many of them a period of dissolution." Ruined miners saw their estates confiscated and sold by auction. Enrique Florescano makes the somewhat paradoxical claim that both boom and decline in mining favored the north Mexican haciendas. First, because profits were then used to expand the landed property; second, because in that situation people preferred to invest money outside mining. On the other hand, the recurrent agrarian subsistence crisis would hurt both mines and haciendas. In Alvaro Jara (ed. 
Landownership a Question of Prestige?
The question of non-economic motivations behind the formation of the hacienda was first raised by Chevalier. According to the French scholar, the hacendado with his peculiar, archaic mentality, "acquired land not to increase his earnings, but to eliminate rivals and hold sway over an entire region." Thus Chevalier easily discerned a parallel between the Mexican hacendados and the "ricos homes" of Medieval Castile.36 This interpretation can be challenged on several points. We have already referred to Lockhart's observation that land hoarding in order to drive out competitors made perfect sense in terms of the economic ideas of the time. Indeed, Chevalier himself better than anybody else described how the expansion of the haciendas deprived many Indians and mestizo peasants of their lands, forcing them to join the labor force of the estates. As Florescano observes, haciendas often had to reduce their production due to the limitations of the market and the drastic fall of prices when harvests were plentiful. Why then did they bother to expand? Because by depriving their neighbors of their lands, the hacendados wiped out competing production or forced hitherto self-sufficient small producers to become consumers of hacienda products, instead.37 It is also important to keep in mind that in the beginning of Spanish colonization land was practically a free utility, of no value without labor. Even as late as the eighteenth century when land values were rising, the monopoly of agricultural accessories such as cattle, seed, and water for irrigation remained more valuable than land possession itself. Still, the point made by Chevalier cannot simply be disregarded. The question of non-economic motivations actually seems to become even more intriguing in the case of a later generation of hacendados, those of the late eighteenth century. This is the phenomenon described by David Brading: "The fortunes created in mining and commerce were invested in land, there to be slowly dissipated or to be gradually transferred into the coffers of the Church." The process was related to the aristocratic ambitions of the new wealthy class, who bought titles and founded entailed estates or mayorazgos.4' In his dissertation on the Coahuilan latifundio of the Sanchez Navarros, Charles H. Harris contradicts the notion that such motivation was universal by showing that that particular family was clearly moved by purely economic considerations and that it also succeeded in amassing an impressive fortune in the short time span of 1765-1821. However, it should be noted that the Sanchez Navarros retained the commercial enterprise that had financed their very first acquisition of land. Thus, Harris concludes that it was precisely "because the Sanchez Navarros were not entirely dependent on their latifundio that they made such a notable success of it." 42 The the same family during extended periods of time. In the Valley of Putaendo, Chile, the largest hacienda passed intact from one generation to another between 1670 and 1880.56 To ensure such a stability of ownership, there was the device of mayorazgo, but it does not seem to have been very extensively used.57 As Mario G6ngora points out, there were many other legal forms and family agreements that could serve the same purpose.58 In the case of the hacienda of Guachala in the Valley of Cayambe in Northern Ecuador, all transfers were through inheritance from the mid-seventeenth century through 1819. From then until 1892, four transfers were made through purchase, and only one through inheritance.59 However, ownership continuity and transfer of property mainly through inheritance cannot be considered universal during the colonial period either. In colonial Oaxaca, according to William Taylor, there was a striking lack of such stability. Estates changed hands frequently, and through purchase more often than not. 
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It is a general notion that haciendas were often heavily burdened with encumbrances and debts. An exceptionally interesting published document from the early eighteenth century proves that this was, indeed, true for the province of Tlaxcala in New Spain. Another document, on the neighboring district of Cholula in 1790, shows that the haciendas there, valued at 788,ooo pesos, had to pay a total of 550,ooo pesos in obligations.65 This may have been an exceptional case, but the level of indebtedness of the haciendas was probably often high. This helps to explain why they changed hands so often. Taylor's table  on Riley in his paper on the Jesuit hacienda of Santa Lucia states that workers' debts were small and labor mobility high. He even declares that the hacienda administration "set artificially low prices on goods," a striking contrast to the system as described by Macera. Unfortunately he does not state the amounts. The trend he shows should be seen against the backdrop of falling real wages and the decline of an originally flourishing sheep-breeding economy.79 To summarize, it is clear that the traditional view of a necessary connection between hacienda and debt peonage must be rejected. On the other hand, it is as yet too early to venture any other generalizations about the role of labor indebtedness. The examples known to us present a great variety.80
As is well known, different categories of tenant labor have formed a major part of the resident labor force of the haciendas in recent times. The historical development of this kind of labor is very little known, however. Gongora's perceptive study of the origins of the Chilean inquilino remains almost unique. According to the traditional view, the inquilinos derived from a group of Indian workers formed in the wake of the abolition of the encomienda. But Go'ngora shows that, instead, the inquilinato gradually developed from a form of nonIndian tenancy. Whereas seventeenth-century estancieros let out land in exchange for almost symbolic rents (pre'stamos de tierras), in the eighteenth century, when growing wheat exports to Peru raised land values, rents were considerably augmented. Towards the end of the century, many tenants found themselves obliged to pay their rent by day labor. Their social status sank and their lots of land grew smaller. But, as Gongora sees it, the real transformation of the incquilinos into a proletariat took place only during the nineteenth century. The change is mainly explained by their increasing numbers.8' The nineteenth- 8i. Mario G(,ngora, Origen de los "inquilinos" de Chile Central (Santiago de Chile, 1960). It is interesting to compare this with the trend observed by Brading, in his Rome paper on the Bajio towards the end of the eighteenth century, to <'raise rents, and to replace customary obligations and privileges by cash payments." In both cases a more abundant supply of workers and an expanding market led to greater pressure on the lower rural strata, but in different directions.
century history of the inquilinos has been studied by Bauer, who maintains that they were still better off than ordinary peons. He suggests that rural wages in Chile fell 50 per cent between 1830 and i88o, for him a much more crucial period in the expansion of wheat exports than the eighteenth century.82 In the case of Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, there seems to exist an institutional linkage between the yanaconas of the sixteenth century and the colons of recent times. The problem ought to be studied, however, within the context of the whole development of agrarian structure.83 According to Karen Spalding, the economic contraction of the Peruvian viceroyalty in the eighteenth century forced many Indians to sell themselves to the hacendados. These would then take care of the debts the Indians had incurred to the corregidores when unable to pay for the repartimiento de mercancias.84 In the case of Quito, Udo Oberem has outlined how the yanaconas, around i6oo, were transformed into conciertos, in more recent times known as huasipungueros. His study highlights the abusive treatment they experienced.85
The whole study of hacienda labor is extraordinarily difficult as a result of the usually oral character of labor contracts and because wages more often than not were paid in kind. Macera has made an acute attempt to analyze rural wages on the basis of Jesuit records, but he fails to take into account the value of the usufruct of the parcels that the workers probably also enjoyed.86 Apart from the rich documentation concerning the expropriated Jesuit haciendas, accounts Today, the unequal distribution of material benefits among the workers of contemporary haciendas and the stratification of these communities are easy to observe. But it is very difficult to find out if these features are old or relatively new. The demographic factor, that is, the slowly increasing supply of labor in the Andean areas, in any case had a profound impact on hacienda labor relations.
Markets, Profitability and Credit
Contemporary studies underscore the low productivity of traditional haciendas. Only a minor part of the cultivable area is utilized. Due to the low level of their technology, capitalization and management, production is mainly determined by the quantity of labor used. Still, a "seigneurial" pattern of income distribution assures large landowners considerable income, a great part of which is absorbed by sumptuary consumption.88 Even contemporary students find it difficult, however, to distinguish the role of the haciendas from the many other enterprises in which the large landowners are often engaged. Do the haciendas help to finance these other activities or is the opposite more often the case?89
If economic analysis is imperfect concerning the present, our knowledge about the profitability of haciendas in the past is veiy poor indeed. David Brading takes a gloomy view of the eighteenth- distance and the quality of communications to the market and the size of the market crucially affected production. German Colmenares quotes a report from 1692 on some Jesuit haciendas in New Granada: "era inuttil cultivarlas pues no habia mercados para sus productos."96 Florescano underscores how distances, bad roads and high freights prevented Mexican grain-producing haciendas from developing their productive capacity beyond what the local market required.97 Speaking of central Chile, Arnold Bauer claims that the income of the large estates in this fertile region remained negligible until the middle of the nineteenth century, due to the lack of markets. Only exceptionally did trans-Atlantic wheat exports during the period 1865-188o make Chilean agriculture really profitable. Expanded production, when necessary, was achieved merely by extending cultivation and by using additional manpower. Incentives to raise productivity by intensive methods were lacking.98
To obtain at least some idea of the evolution of the hacienda as an economic enterprise through time, we need a great number of welldistributed monographical studies. As it happens, the few that we have all deal with areas situated close to important markets: the Valley of Puangue in Chile, that of Chancay in Peru and, of course, the Valley of Mexico.99 We also have to try to reconstruct the movements of agricultural prices. The prices of those cash crops which would provide haciendas with their main income, whether wheat or pulque or wool, are of course especially important. In the case of those estates for which records are indeed available, we have to attempt to calculate the development of their productivity, as well as that of their profitability, which was often a different matter.'00 As Jose Carlos Mariategui once put it, "the hacendado does not concern himself with the productivity of the soil. He is only concerned with its profitability," that is, he tries to exploit "Indian labor boundlessly."'01 Profits, in fact, cannot be separated from the patterns of consumption and investment of the landowning class. Juan Villamarin makes a 96. Colmenares, Haciendas, p. 41. 97. Florescano, Precios del maiz, p. 184. 98. Bauer, "Expansion," pp. 172-173. In "El Huique," Bauer emphasizes that the low degree of technology and the abundance of land and labor made Chilean hacienda agriculture remarkably flexible in the face of a very uncertain market.
99. No hacienda could be closer to an important market than Hueyapan. Unfortunately Couturier, in her dissertation, reports (p. 95) that she was unable to find any records on the marketing relationship with Pachuca.
1oo. As Bauer ("El Huique") points out, production costs and efficiency are very difficult to get at, due to the lack of data on acreage, types of land, and labor input for each crop.
1o0. MariAtegui, Siete ensayos de la realidad peruana (Santiago de Chile, 1955), p. 69.
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distinction between funds for "ceremonial" (mainly religious), "social," and actually economic purposes, which seems quite enlightening.102 "Ceremonial" investments were, of course, also very important in the case of ecclesiastical holdings. Thus, even in the case of prosperous haciendas, the question of credit would sooner or later arise, due to consumption and investment patterns as well as to the hazards of weather and adverse market conditions. The Church's role as a source of credit was important from the beginning. Michael Costeloe's work on the Juzgado de Capelianias in Mexico during the first half of the nineteenth century gives an excellent account of this kind of operation.103 The Jesuits were also important lenders. However, it appears from recent research that the extent of ecclesiastical credit has often been exaggerated. As Bauer put it, merchants were prepared to extend "higher-yield/high-risk" credit. Thus, they would lend money to landowners, who were not solvent enough to receive church credit, at higher interest rates. Towards 1goo some modernizing hacendados make their appearance. Did they obtain the capital they invested through loans or through reinvestment of profits?'09 In her study of the hacienda of San Juan Hueyapan in Mexico, Couturier points out that the hacendado obtained credit from the Banco Comercial in 1902 which allowed him rapidly to construct a new mansion, to irrigate part of the terrain, and to buy machinery. But there was a purpose of ostentation in all this rather than an intent to obtain returns on the capital invested, the author claims. Also, the landowners did not really distinguish between their personal expenditures and the costs of production.110
When modernization was more advanced, as in the case of the sugar estates of Morelos, industrialized from the i88os onwards, the social equilibrium was lost. As Fran'gois Chevalier and John Womack, Jr., have pointed out, the aggressive territorial expansion of these estates to acquire new land as well as dependent labor, provided the special preconditions for the revolt of Emiliano Zapata-'1
The Hacienda as a Social Unit
The hacienda, in recent times, has been characterized by having its own social hierarchy, provision for internal supply of goods and services and, to some extent, its own administration. Because haciendas differ greatly in size and type of production, their role as centers of population will also vary. Sometimes, the peons and their families are grouped closely together in villorios or caserios in the shadow of the mansion and the chapel. In other cases, the people of the hacienda live scattered on the marginal lands where their usufruct parcels are also located.112
The origins of these patterns have so far received little attention from historians. In a recent work I tried to outline in very broad terms how the sixteenth-century dualist pattern of Spanish towns and Indian villages gradually became blurred or vanished. Eighteenth-century sources suggest that, in many areas, the majority of the rural inhabitants had already formed new clusters of population around the 114. Spalding, "Tratos mercantiles del corregidor," p. 607, says that she did not find population records indicating the division into pueblos and haciendas prior to 1792. At the Archivo Arquidiocesano, Cuzco, I came across a padron of this type dating from 1729 (Fundos 34-298-3) . In a dossier on "Tributos de Calca . . . 1784" at the Archivo Hist6rico de la Universidad Nacional del Cuzco I found correspondence indicating that Indian tenant labor would be classified as forasteros.
115 Macera, "Feudalismo," pp. Among those who think it is, the non-Marxist French political scientist Jacques Lambert sees Latin America as an essentially dual society, divided into one capitalist, dynamic, mostly urban sector and a "feudal," traditional, agrarian one. When "capitalism" was introduced into Latin America a hundred years ago or less, "it clashed with a still young and strong feudal society," Lambert wants us to believe. Owing to their capacity to resist change, haciendas would be a major factor in preserving the tragic division of society discerned by the dualist school.120 Basically the same view is held by such Marxist writers as Jos6e Carlos Mariategui, who strongly emphasized the "organic and fundamental difference" between the feudal or semifeudal economy of the Peruvian sierra and the capitalist economy of the coast.121
However, more than twenty years ago, Jan Bazant presented a contrary interpretation of the hacienda. Different from the encomienda, with its "feudal" mode of production, the hacienda was characterized by its capitalist mode of production, Bazant asserted.'22 It is curious to observe that Robert Keith's recent article provides a very similar interpretation, though not formulated in Marxist terms. As Keith sees it, the encomienda was "essentially a pre-capitalistic institution," though modified by capitalistic features, whereas the hacienda would be a basically capitalistic institution, "corrupted" by "feudal" features.'23 Those who have read Jos' Miranda's excellent but littleknown study of the entrepreneurial activities of sixteenth-century encomenderos would surely hesitate in making such a distinction.'24 The most emphatically anti-dualist view, in any case, has been expressed by Andre Gunder Frank. For him the so-called "archaic" or "feudal" sector of society is a complete illusion, produced by "the internal contradictions" of the capitalist system. In Frank's opinion, ex- When confronted with the presence of nonmonetary relations in agriculture Frank explains that terms like "feudal" or "capitalist" must be reserved for the entire socio-economic system instead of being applied to all sorts of "associated features." He believes that historical research will show that the so-called feudal haciendas which are relatively isolated and self-sufficient today "were usually not organized" in this way. They were the result of an earlier commercial development which declined.125 I think historians had better take this last suggestion seriously. It seems likely, for instance, that the haciendas of the Cuzco region were commercialized to a considerably higher degree in the eighteenth century than they were during the nineteenth. Frank's interpretation has been much criticized, however, from both Marxist and non-Marxist quarters, for being simplistic and excessively static and rigid. Ruggiero Romano, among other things, objects to Frank's refusal to accept the existence of "surplus" in a "feudal" society. This is in harmony with Marcello Carmagnani's analysis of colonial Chile: "a seigneurial and dependent economy may experience sustained growth . . . of production, as long as there is an external or induced demand that provides the stimulus." Frank can also be criticized for having simplified the concept of "dualism" in order to refute it. Romano points to the possible co-existence of "feudal" and "capitalist" elements in the same environment, even within the same enterprise.'26
The easiest way out of the dilemma is, of course, simply to call the hacienda "semi-feudar' or "half-feudal, half-capitalist" as some authors have been content to do whereas the internal economy of the hacienda was non-monetary, externally it was a part of the money economy of its time. The "feudal" character of the agrarian sector was simply a consequence of the colonial status of Spanish America. Thus, the Spanish American "mode of production could well be defined as a dependent sub-capitalism which in order to be precisely that, needed an agrarian feudalism of a colonial type." For Macera the appearance of outmoded, "archaic" social forms in the New World in the wake of the Conquest was the price that Europe made the colonies pay for its own modernization. 128 The idea that the expansion of the capitalist world market at certain stages produces or rather reproduces archaic socio-economic phenomena on the frontier of development is also supported by Eric Hobsbawm. In his study of the haciendas and labor of twentiethcentury La Convencion, Peru, he argues that "serfdom" in this area was not so much "the child of feudal tradition as the response by powerful landlords to an economic condition." This would refer to increasing external demand for the products of the district, where labor, free, forced or enslaved, was scarce. The tenant labor system, here called arriendo, would then necessarily follow from the decision of the landowners "to undertake demesne cultivation under conditions of labor shortage and inadequate communications."129
In his recent dissertation Cristobal Kay, as already mentioned, makes the relationship between demesne and peasant cultivation the criterion for his analysis of hacienda. With increased demand, an estate is likely to pass from the Grundherrschaft type to that of Gutsherrschaft, where manpower is mainly occupied on the demesne of the landlord. Kay thinks, for example, that haciendas in central Chile underwent this transformation during the latter part of the nineteenth century.130 His interpretation is not wholly convincing, but it has the advantage of drawing attention to the parallels between the 128. Macera, "Feudalismo." In his Marxist analysis, "Feudalismus und Kapitalismus in der Kolonialgeschichte Lateinamerikas" (Rome, 1972), Manfred Kossok accepts Macera's analysis of the double nature of the hacienda but rejects his notion of "sub-capitalism." He also cautiously points out that there being no hacienda "an sich" (that is, in the abstract), the approach must be an empirical one. As it is, to date the theoretical discussion of the hacienda and of Latin American economic history in general is far from impressive. Non-Marxists have been strikingly superficial and vague, while Marxists, more often than not, seem merely confused when confronted with a complex historical reality.'33
Sources
There are two main categories of source material available for hacienda history: records kept by the landowners themselves, and public or publicly registered documents referring to their estates. These two categories complement each other. It is obvious, however, that it is mainly the former which provides insight into the inner workings of the hacienda.
Hacienda papers can be broken down into several categories-property titles; correspondence, for instance between an absent owner and his administrator; inventories; and last but not least, accounts. Most "hacienda archives" merely contain a batch of titulos, though some comprise more. In the case of Mexican haciendas, the vast collection of Sanchez Navarro papers at the University of Texas and that of Regla papers at Washington State University are well known.'34 There is also, for instance, the collection of the Ipifia-Vera'stegui family of San Luis 131. It is my impression that the usual insistence on comparing the medieval manor and the hacienda has been unfortunate. The time difference makes such comparisons especially difficult and risky. On the other hand, I had long been wondering why nobody seemed to notice the striking similarities between the agrarian structures of Latin America and those of Eastern Europe, when I found that Mario G6ngora, in his Encomenderos y estancieros, pp. 132-122, makes precisely this point. The expropriation of all the properties of the Society of Jesus in 1767 resulted in the preservation of an unsurpassed wealth of documentation on a considerable number of properties, scattered throughout Spanish America. These collections are widely distributed. The one at the National Archives of Santiago de Chile is especially rich. Referring to the holdings there on Mexico, Hermes Tovar says that they not only give us a complete view of the situation of each property in 1767, but also of its state five, ten or fifteen years later, when it was auctioned or sold. At times, serial data on costs and production comprise two or three decades, beginning some five years before the expulsion.138 During recent years Pablo Macera, Germ'n Colmenares, and others have explored Jesuit documentation on colonial landholding. However, to generalize on the basis of Jesuit material alone is
